The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 47 (2009)

Article 5

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
Canadian Officials Abroad
Donald J. Rennie
Ramona Rothschild

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Rennie, Donald J. and Rothschild, Ramona. "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Canadian Officials Abroad." The
Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 47. (2009).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol47/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and Canadian Officials
Abroad
Donald J. Rennie and Ramona Rothschild

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1
which defines the Charter‟s application, does not expressly impose
territorial limits on its reach.2 As a consequence, it has fallen on the
courts to interpret the scope of the Charter‟s application, and to
determine whether and to what extent the Charter applies to government
action outside Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled on the application of the
Charter to the actions of government officials outside Canada on several
occasions. It has been firmly established that the Charter does not apply
to the actions of foreign authorities in foreign jurisdictions.3 Moreover, in


Counsel, Department of Justice Canada. All opinions expressed in this paper are those of
the authors and do not in any way represent the views of the Attorney General of Canada, any
official of the Department of Justice Canada or the policy of the Government of Canada. The authors
would like to thank R. Jeff Anderson, Robert Frater, Hoi Kong and Doreen Mueller for their helpful
comments and suggestions on the initial drafts of this paper. They would also like to thank Brian R.
Evernden for his thoughtful presentation of this paper at Osgoode‟s 2008 Constitutional Cases
Conference. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Section 32(1) provides as follows:
This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the
authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within
the authority of the legislature of each province.
3
R. v. Harrer, [1995] S.C.J. No. 81, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.); R. v. Terry, [1996]
S.C.J. No. 62, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.); Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J.
No. 42, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 (S.C.C.). Note, however, that an individual may have a valid s. 7 claim
in Canada even if the potential deprivation of his or her life, liberty or security will be effected
abroad, if it is established that Canada‟s participation is a necessary precondition for the deprivation
and if the deprivation is a foreseeable consequence of Canada‟s participation. See Suresh v. Canada
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2007, in R. v. Hape,4 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
effectively overruled the majority‟s earlier decision in R. v. Cook5 and
decided that the Charter does not apply to investigations by Canadian
state actors in the territory of another state absent the foreign state‟s
consent or some other limited basis recognized in international law. As a
result, Canadian officials involved in investigations abroad generally do
so under the laws and procedures of the foreign state.
Both Cook and Hape were decided in the context of criminal
prosecutions in Canada, where the issue was whether evidence obtained
by Canadian state actors outside the country should be excluded at trial
in Canada because it was obtained in a manner that did not conform to
Charter standards. In 2008, in Canada (Justice) v. Khadr,6 the Supreme
Court of Canada considered the application of the Charter in a case
involving the activities of Canadian officials and their impact abroad
upon a Canadian citizen‟s liberty interest and right to a fair process,
where there was no domestic criminal prosecution and where the rights
claimant was not even present in Canada.
This paper will identify issues arising from the Hape and Khadr
decisions that have been recently addressed by the Federal Courts. It is
divided into two substantive parts. The first describes the Hape and
Khadr decisions. The second describes how, in three recent decisions,
the Federal Courts have addressed two issues arising from these
decisions: (1) whether there exists a “fundamental human rights
exception” to the general rule that the Charter does not apply extraterritorially; and (2) whether non-Canadian citizens outside Canada who
are not subjected to a Canadian judicial process are beneficiaries of
Charter rights.

(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 54
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]. See also United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
283 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Burns”] and Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 24, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
500 (S.C.C.).
4
[2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”].
5
[1998] S.C.J. No. 68, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cook”]. In Cook, the
majority (Lamer C.J.C., Cory, Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ.) ruled that in rare circumstances the
Charter could apply to the acts of Canadian officials outside Canada based on Canada‟s jurisdiction
over its nationals where the application of Charter standards would not conflict with the concurrent
territorial jurisdiction of the foreign state, thereby generating an “objectionable extraterritorial
effect” (id., at para. 25). Here, they held that the Charter applied to the actions of Canadian
detectives in interviewing the accused in the United States.
6
[2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khadr”].
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II. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA CASES
1. R. v. Hape
In Hape, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada7 held that the
Charter does not apply to investigations carried out by Canadian state
actors in the territory of another state absent the foreign state‟s consent
or, more exceptionally, some other basis under international law. Hence,
Canadian officials involved in investigations abroad are not bound by
Charter requirements in the manner in which investigations are conducted.
Rather, the law of the state in which the investigation occurred would
apply.
In Hape, the appellant was a Canadian businessman who had been
convicted in Canada of money laundering. At his trial, the Crown had
adduced documentary evidence that the RCMP had gathered from the
accused‟s office in the Turks and Caicos. The accused had sought to
have the evidence excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter,8 on
the basis that it had been obtained in violation of his right under section 8
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.9
The RCMP‟s investigation in the Turks and Caicos had been carried
out under the authority and control of the Turks and Caicos police force.
No warrant had been obtained authorizing perimeter searches of the
accused‟s investment company in that country. Evidently a warrant was
not required to conduct such searches under Turks and Caicos law, but in
most circumstances one would have been required under Canadian law.
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Charter applied
to the searches and seizures carried out by the RCMP officers outside
Canada. The Court upheld the convictions, the majority determining that
the Charter generally did not apply to searches and seizures carried out
by Canadian state actors abroad, and did not apply in the circumstances
of this case.
7
The majority judgment of McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Charron JJ.
was written by LeBel J.
8
Section 24(2) of the Charter provides as follows:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.
9
Section 8 of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure.”
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The majority directed that any inquiry into the extra-territorial
application of the Charter “begins and ends” with section 32(1). That
provision defines to whom and in what circumstances the Charter
applies. The fact that a state actor is involved is not in itself sufficient;
the activity in question must also fall within the “matters within the
authority of” Parliament or the provincial legislatures.10
Guided by the principle of statutory interpretation that legislation
will be presumed to conform to international law as well as the principle
of comity of nations, the majority of the Supreme Court interpreted
section 32(1) with reference to principles of customary international law.
Writing for the majority, LeBel J. was careful to draw a distinction
between international law and comity, stating that “[i]nternational law is
a positive legal order, whereas comity … is of the nature of a principle of
interpretation.”11
The majority asserted that under international law, the authority of a
state to exercise jurisdiction over matters arising outside its territory is
strictly limited.12 Of particular significance, by virtue of the territorial
sovereignty of states, it is a well-established principle that a state cannot
act to enforce, or give effect to, its laws within the territory of another
state absent the other state‟s consent or, in exceptional cases, some other
basis in international law.13 Absent such an exception, an investigation in
a foreign state is not a matter within the authority of Parliament or the
provincial legislatures for the purposes of section 32(1) of the Charter, as
these bodies do not have the jurisdiction to authorize the enforcement of

10

Hape, supra, note 4, at paras. 93-94.
Id., at para. 50.
Justice LeBel distinguished between three different types of jurisdiction. Prescriptive
jurisdiction is the “power to make rules, issue commands or grant authorizations that are binding
upon persons and entities”. Enforcement jurisdiction is “the power to use coercive means to ensure
that rules are followed, commands are executed or entitlements are upheld”. Adjudicative
jurisdiction is “the power of a state‟s courts to resolve disputes or interpret the law through decisions
that carry binding force” (id., at para. 58).
Justice LeBel explained that the primary basis for a state‟s jurisdiction is the principle of
territoriality. A state has full authority to exercise jurisdiction — prescriptive, enforcement and
adjudicative — over matters arising and people residing within its borders. A secondary basis for
jurisdiction is the nationality principle. States may assert certain jurisdiction over acts occurring
within the territory of a foreign state on the basis that their nationals are involved, in order to attach
domestic consequences to events that occurred abroad. However, under international law, a state
would not have the authority to enforce its laws over the national outside its borders (id., at paras.
59-60).
13
Id., at para. 65.
11
12

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CANADIAN OFFICIALS ABROAD

131

Canadian laws, including the Charter, over such a matter outside
Canada.14
The majority reasoned that if compliance with its legal requirements
cannot be enforced, the Charter cannot be applied. Therefore, as a rule,
the Charter does not apply to investigations in foreign countries.
Exceptions to the rule may arise where the foreign state has consented to
the application of Canadian law or, more exceptionally, where there
exists some other basis in international law that would justify the
Charter‟s application. Justice LeBel wrote:
[T]he Charter cannot be applied if compliance with its legal
requirements cannot be enforced. Enforcement of compliance with the
Charter means that when state agents act, they must do so in
accordance with the requirements of the Charter so as to give effect to
Canadian law as it applies to the exercise of the state power at issue.
However, … Canadian law cannot be enforced in another state‟s
territory without that state‟s consent. Since extraterritorial enforcement
is not possible, and enforcement is necessary for the Charter to apply,
extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible.15

The majority was also guided in its interpretation of section 32(1) by
the notion of comity, an interpretive principle which encourages states to
cooperate with each other with mutual deference and respect. According
to the majority, the principle of comity allows Canadian officers to
participate in investigations abroad even where there is no obligation to
do so. In addition, the principle of comity encourages a state seeking
assistance from another state to respect the way in which the latter state
chooses to provide assistance within its territory. Nonetheless, the
majority noted that comity may not be required where the assisting state
acts in violation of international law. Justice LeBel stated that Canadian
14
Id., at paras. 57-69, 84-85, 104-105. The majority recognized that Canada has the
authority to make laws having extraterritorial operation, and that Canada has enacted legislation with
extraterritorial effects. For example, the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000,
c. 24, provides in s. 6(1) that every person who commits genocide, a crime against humanity or a war
crime outside Canada is guilty of an indictable offence. Pursuant to s. 8, such a person may be
prosecuted in Canada (a) if at the time of the offence the person was a Canadian citizen or a citizen
of a state engaged in armed conflict against Canada, or the victim was a Canadian citizen or a citizen
of a state allied with Canada in an armed conflict; or (b) if, after the time the offence was committed,
the person is present in Canada. According to LeBel J., “[t]hese provisions exemplify valid
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, and any trial for such offences would constitute a legitimate
exercise of extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction” (id., at para. 66). However, these provisions do
not authorize Canada to enforce the prohibitions in a foreign state‟s territory by arresting the
offender there. Id., at para. 66.
15
Id., at para. 85.
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officials may be prohibited from participating abroad in activities
sanctioned by foreign law that would place Canada in violation of its
international human rights obligations.16
The majority held that individuals cannot expect to take Charter
rights with them outside Canada‟s borders. However, they articulated
two means of protecting the interests of the individual. First, where the
Crown seeks to adduce evidence gathered abroad at a trial in Canada,
such evidence may be excluded under section 7 or section 11(d) of the
Charter if to admit it would render the trial unfair.17
Second, participation abroad by Canadian officials in activities that
would violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations “might
justify a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter because of the impact of
those activities on Charter rights in Canada”.18 In such circumstances,
there would be an exception to the principle of comity which would
otherwise allow Canadian officers to participate.19
Based on these considerations, the majority articulated a methodology
to determine whether the Charter applies to investigations outside
Canada by virtue of section 32(1). First, it must be determined whether
the conduct at issue is that of a Canadian state actor. Second, if so, it
must be determined whether the activity in question is a matter within the
authority of Parliament or the provincial legislatures. Unless there is
consent or some other exceptional basis in international law that would
justify the application of the Charter to the extraterritorial activities of
the state actor, such activities do not fall within the authority of
Parliament or the provincial legislatures. According to the majority, in
most cases there will be no such exception and the Charter will not
apply.20

16

Id., at paras. 50-52, 101.
Id., at paras. 100, 108-112. A court must consider all of the circumstances in which
evidence was gathered to determine whether its admission would render a trial unfair. It will not
automatically follow that a trial will be unfair if evidence is admitted that was obtained in
circumstances that did not meet Charter requirements (id., at paras. 108-109).
18
Id., at para. 101. See also paras. 51-52, 90.
19
Id., at paras. 90, 101.
20
Id., at paras. 102-106, 113. In Hape, the majority found that the Turks and Caicos had not
consented to the enforcement of Canadian law within its territory. In addition, although this matter
was not raised on appeal, the majority found that the circumstances did not demonstrate that the
admission of the evidence violated the appellant‟s right to a fair trial.
17
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2. Canada (Justice) v. Khadr
In May 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada decided in Khadr that
Canada was bound by the Charter where Canadian officials had
participated overseas in a process that was contrary to Canada‟s
international human rights obligations.21 In this case, the respondent,
Omar Khadr, was a Canadian citizen who had been detained by U.S.
Forces in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he faced terrorism-related
charges before a U.S. Military Commission. Before the charges were
laid, with the consent of U.S. authorities, Canadian officials had
questioned him in Guantanamo Bay with regard to matters connected to
the eventual charges, and had shared the product of those interviews with
U.S. authorities. After formal charges were laid against him, for the
purposes of raising full answer and defence to those charges and relying
on R. v. Stinchcombe,22 Mr. Khadr sought disclosure in Canada under
section 7 of the Charter of all documents relevant to the charges in the
possession of the federal Crown, including the records of the interviews.
Before the Supreme Court of Canada, relying on Hape, the Crown
opposed this request, in part on the basis that the Charter did not apply
outside Canada and hence did not govern the conduct of Canadian
officials at Guantanamo Bay.23
21
See also Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 2009 FC 405 (F.C.),
affd [2009] F.C.J. No. 893, 2009 FCA 246 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal granted [2009] S.C.C.A. No.
286 (S.C.C.), wherein the Federal Court decided that in the special circumstances of that case — in
particular, Mr. Khadr‟s youth at the relevant time and the direct involvement of Canadian authorities
in his mistreatment at Guantanamo Bay by interrogating him despite knowing that he had been
subjected to sleep deprivation techniques — Canada had violated Mr. Khadr‟s s. 7 Charter rights.
According to the Court, the principles of fundamental justice obliged Canada to protect Mr. Khadr
by taking appropriate steps to ensure that his treatment accorded with international human rights
norms (id., at para. 75). To mitigate the effect of the violation, the Court ordered Canada to request
Mr. Khadr‟s repatriation as soon as practicable. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the
government‟s appeal. On September 4, 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal.
22
[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”]. In
Stinchcombe, the Court recognized that the right to make full answer and defence to criminal charges
is entrenched in s. 7 of the Charter as a principle of fundamental justice.
23
The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal both rendered their decisions before
Hape was released. The Federal Court dismissed Mr. Khadr‟s request for an order directing the
Crown to provide him with disclosure ([2006] F.C.J. No. 640, 2006 FC 509 (F.C.)). The Federal
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a sufficient causal connection between the actions of the
government and the charges against Mr. Khadr so as to engage s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of
Appeal ordered the Crown to produce unredacted copies of all relevant documents in its possession
to the Federal Court for review under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. In light
of the fact that the Crown had already provided Mr. Khadr with redacted copies of some of the
material in its possession further to requests under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. A-1, and through production in other Federal Court proceedings commenced by Mr. Khadr, it was

134

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Basing its decision on the exception to the principle of comity
articulated in Hape, the Court unanimously ruled that the Charter applied
in the circumstances, as Canadian officials had participated in a process
that violated Canada‟s international human rights obligations. The Court
relied on the fact that the regime providing for the detention and trial of
Mr. Khadr at the time Canadian officials had interviewed him and shared
the product of the interviews with U.S. authorities had been found by the
U.S. Supreme Court to violate international human rights obligations to
which Canada is a party (as well as U.S. domestic law).24 By sharing the
product of their interviews with U.S. authorities, Canadian officials had
participated in the process impugned by the U.S. Supreme Court and in
so doing, they had participated in a process that was contrary to Canada‟s
international human rights obligations.25 Accordingly, the deference to
foreign law that would normally be required by the principle of comity
did not apply, and Canada was “bound by the Charter” at the time it
shared this information “to the extent that the conduct of Canadian
officials involved it in a process that violated Canada‟s international
obligations”.26
According to the Court, Mr. Khadr‟s section 7 right to liberty was
engaged by Canada‟s participation in the process that was contrary to
Canada‟s international human rights obligations. In order to mitigate the
effect of that participation, Canada had a duty under section 7 of the
Charter to provide him with disclosure of materials in its possession,
analogous to the disclosure duty in a domestic prosecution.27 However,
the scope of disclosure was limited to materials arising from Canada‟s
participation in the foreign process, as it was that participation that
engaged Mr. Khadr‟s right to liberty.28

left for the Federal Court to decide whether the Crown had complied with its disclosure obligation
([2007] F.C.J. No. 672, 2007 FCA 182 (F.C.A.)).
24
In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
See Khadr, supra, note 6, at paras. 21-25. Note that these decisions were issued after Canadian
officials interviewed Mr. Khadr.
25
Khadr, id., at para. 27. The Court was careful to point out that merely conducting
interviews with a Canadian citizen detained abroad under a violative process may not constitute
participation, as it may often be essential for Canadian officials to interview citizens being held by
violative regimes in order to provide assistance.
26
Id., at para. 26.
27
Id., at paras. 29-32, 34, 37. The Court did not directly apply Stinchcombe, but found that
the principles of fundamental justice bound the Crown in an analogous way.
28
Id., at paras. 29-31.
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The Court concluded that Canada had breached Mr. Khadr‟s section
7 Charter right by refusing to comply with his request for disclosure.29
The Court did not directly apply Stinchcombe by ordering full disclosure,
but decided that Mr. Khadr was entitled under section 7 to disclosure
from the Crown of the records of the interviews, as well as information
given to U.S. authorities as a direct consequence of conducting the
interviews, subject to claims for privilege and public interest immunity.30
In and of itself, sharing the product of the interviews was not found
to constitute a Charter breach.31

III. ISSUES ARISING FROM HAPE AND KHADR
1. “Fundamental Human Rights Exception”
Following Hape, the issue arose concerning whether the majority
had articulated a “fundamental human rights exception” to the general
rule against the extra-territorial application of the Charter, such that the
Charter may be applied in foreign sovereign territory if Canadian state
actors abroad are involved in fundamental human rights violations.
Two months before the Supreme Court‟s Khadr decision was released,
in Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces)32 the
29

Id., at paras. 33, 36.
Id., at paras. 29-32, 37. The Supreme Court‟s disclosure order was more limited in scope
than that of the Federal Court of Appeal. The latter Court ordered that the Crown produce
unredacted copies of all documents in its possession which might be relevant to the charges (see id.,
at paras. 37, 39). See also Purdy v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. No. 1881, 230 D.L.R.
(4th) 361 (B.C.C.A.). In Purdy, the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided that a Canadian
citizen who had been charged with an offence in the United States was entitled to disclosure under
the Charter of material obtained by the RCMP in the course of investigating the offence jointly with
the FBI. The Court held that “s. 7 can be invoked if Canada‟s participation is causally connected to
the deprivation of a liberty interest in a foreign state” (id., at para. 17) (emphasis in original). The
Court noted that the deprivation of the right to full answer and defence occurred in Canada as a
result of the RCMP‟s refusal to make disclosure, even though the effect of the deprivation would be
abroad (id., at para. 20). In addition, the Court held that the disclosure order would not interfere with
the sovereignty of the United States, since “disclosure does no more than put the respondent in the
position where he can offer the evidence obtained by disclosure to the U.S. court; it does not decide
for the court whether to admit the evidence or determine how it should be used” (id., at para. 24).
31
Khadr, id., at para. 27.
32
[2008] F.C.J. No. 356, 2008 FC 336 (F.C.), affd [2008] F.C.J. No. 1700, 2008 FCA 401
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amnesty”]. The
applicants brought an application for judicial review with respect to the transfer or potential transfer
to Afghan authorities of individuals detained by the Canadian Forces. They alleged that the
arrangements between Canada and Afghanistan did not provide adequate substantive or procedural
safeguards to ensure that detainees transferred to Afghanistan would not be exposed to a substantial
30
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Federal Court concluded that the majority decision in Hape did not create
a “fundamental human rights exception” justifying the extraterritorial
application of the Charter, and that the Charter would not apply to
restrain the conduct of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.33
In this case, the applicants argued that the Charter would apply to the
actions of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan in transferring detainees
into the custody of the Afghan authorities if such transfer exposed the
detainees to a substantial risk of torture.34 In essence, their position was
that because transferring detainees to a substantial risk of torture would
violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations, the Charter would
apply.
The applicants relied on the majority‟s decision in Hape for the
proposition that the Charter may exceptionally apply in the territory of
another state where Canadian officials participate in activities in that
state that violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations. The
applicants believed that the existence of a “fundamental human rights
exception” to the rule against the extra-territorial application of the
Charter in Hape was evidenced by the majority‟s affirmation that the
principle of comity may give way where the participation of Canadian
officers in investigations abroad would place Canada in violation of its
international human rights obligations. They also pointed to the
majority‟s statement that in future cases, such participation might justify
a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter because of the impact of
those activities on Charter rights in Canada.35
risk of torture. They sought declarations that ss. 7, 10 and 12 of the Charter applied to individuals
detained by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, a writ of prohibition preventing the transfer of
detainees until such safeguards had been put in place and a writ of mandamus compelling the
respondents to inquire into the status of detainees already transferred to Afghanistan and to demand
their return. The parties agreed to submit two questions to the Court by way of a motion pursuant to
Rule 107(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: (a) Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms apply during the armed conflict in Afghanistan to the detention of non-Canadians by the
Canadian Forces or their transfer to Afghan authorities to be dealt with by those authorities?; and (b)
If the answer to the above question is “no”, then would the Charter nonetheless apply if the
applicants were ultimately able to establish that the transfer of the detainees in question would
expose them to a substantial risk of torture? This paper does not address the issues in relation to
question (a).
33
Amnesty, id., at paras. 303-328 (F.C.).
34
The Supreme Court of Canada has concluded that international law generally rejects
extradition to the death penalty for abolitionist states (see Burns, supra, note 3) and deportation to a
real risk of torture (see Suresh, supra, note 3). In both Burns and Suresh, the Supreme Court was
dealing with removals of persons from Canada to a foreign state; in the Amnesty litigation, id., the
individuals in question were outside Canada so the issue was one of extraterritorial transfer, not
removal.
35
Amnesty, supra, note 32, at paras. 305-307 (F.C.).
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The Federal Court decided that no such exception to the territorial
application of the Charter had been articulated in Hape. The Court
reasoned that the application of the Charter cannot be dependent on
whether a fundamental human right has been infringed. The Court wrote:
Surely Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, either applies in relation to the detention of individuals by
the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, or it does not. It cannot be that the
Charter will not apply where the breach of a detainee‟s purported
Charter rights is of a minor or technical nature, but will apply where the
breach puts the detainee‟s fundamental human rights at risk.
That is, it cannot be that it is the nature or quality of the Charter
breach that creates extraterritorial jurisdiction, where it does not
otherwise exist. That would be a completely unprincipled approach to
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.36

The Court stated that to find that the Charter applied as a result of the
seriousness of the impugned actions or their effects would be to conflate
the question of the existence of Charter jurisdiction with the question of
whether a fundamental right had been infringed.37 The Court also noted
that if the application of the Charter were dependent on the nature of the
breach, this would lead to “tremendous uncertainty” for Canadian state
actors carrying out activities in foreign countries,38 presumably because
they would not be governed by a legally predictable set of rules.
In addition, the Federal Court found that the majority‟s reasons in
Hape did not support the recognition of a “fundamental human rights
exception”. According to the Court, the majority in Hape had stated that
Canadian officials operating outside Canada cannot act in a way that
violates Canada‟s international human rights obligations. However, it did
not follow from the fact that international human rights law obligations
may operate to constrain the activities of Canadian state actors abroad
that the Charter would apply to such activities. The Federal Court also
asserted that its interpretation of Hape was supported by the concurring
decisions of Bastarache and Binnie JJ., both of whom saw the majority as
substituting international human rights law for Charter guarantees.39
The Court also considered the majority‟s statement in Hape that
participation by Canadian officials operating oversees in activities that
36
37
38
39

Id., at paras. 310-311.
Id., at paras. 312-313.
Id., at paras. 312-314.
Id., at paras. 315-324.
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would breach Canada‟s international human rights obligations might
justify a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter because of the impact
of those activities on Charter rights in Canada. The Court found that such
a situation did not arise in this case, as it was difficult to perceive of an
impact on Charter rights in Canada.40
Based in part on the foregoing considerations, the Federal Court
concluded that individuals held in Canadian Forces detention facilities in
Afghanistan did not enjoy rights under the Charter, but rather enjoyed
rights conferred on them by the Afghan constitution and by international
law.41
By the time this matter was before the Federal Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court‟s Khadr decision had been released. The appellants
argued that the Supreme Court in Khadr had “confirmed that Hape did
indeed find that the Charter applied extraterritorially in respect of
fundamental human rights violations at international law”.42 The Federal
Court of Appeal rejected this argument, and affirmed the lower court‟s
decision. In so doing, the appellate court expressed agreement with the
Federal Court‟s reasons, and asserted that “Khadr has not changed the
principles applicable to the concepts of territoriality and of comity set out
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hape.”43
According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court in
Khadr had confirmed that comity, or deference for a foreign process,
should give way where participation in activities in a foreign state would
place Canada in violation of its international human rights obligations.
However, it did not follow that the Charter would then apply in the
territory of that foreign state as a consequence of such a violation.44
The Federal Court of Appeal also pointed out that the disclosure
order granted by the Supreme Court in Khadr “remained territorial”, in
40

Id., at paras. 325-326.
Id., at para. 327.
Id., at para. 8 (F.C.A.) (quoting para. 37 of the appellants‟ memorandum).
43
Id., at para. 9. But see Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), supra, note 21, wherein the
Federal Court accepted that the Supreme Court in Hape and Khadr had concluded that an exception
to the general rule that the Charter does not apply extraterritorially arises where the activities of
Canadian officials operating outside Canada violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations.
The Court stated at para. 30:
The Court [in Khadr] referred to its prior decision in R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26 where it
had concluded that the Charter generally does not apply to Canadian investigators
operating outside of Canada. But Hape had also identified an exception to that general
rule where the activities of Canadian agents violated Canada‟s international obligations,
particularly its human rights commitments.
44
Amnesty, id., at paras. 19-20.
41
42
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that it only encompassed Canadian documents.45 It characterized Khadr
as “a case where a Canadian citizen obtained disclosure of documents
held in Canada and produced by Canadian officials for a breach of his
rights under section 7 of the Charter by Canadian officials participating
in a foreign process that violated Canada‟s international human rights
obligations.”46 According to the Court of Appeal, the factual underpinning
of Khadr was “miles apart” from the situation in Amnesty, where
“foreigners, with no attachment whatsoever to Canada or its laws, are
held in CF detention facilities in Afghanistan”.47 The Supreme Court of
Canada denied the appellants leave to appeal.
2. Beneficiaries of Charter Rights
A second issue arising from the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence on
the extraterritorial application of the Charter is the extent to which a nonCanadian citizen outside Canada who is not subjected to a Canadian
judicial process is entitled to claim Charter rights.48
45

Id., at para. 11.
Id., at para. 13.
47
Id., at para. 14.
48
The issue of whether non-citizens residing outside Canada are able to claim rights under
the Charter has also arisen in the immigration law context. Recent jurisprudence in this area suggests
that non-citizens residing outside Canada are not entitled to the protection of the Charter. See Deol v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1034, 2001 FCT 694
(F.C.T.D.), affd on other grounds [2002] F.C.J. No. 949, 2002 FCA 271 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal
refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 358 (S.C.C.); Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1997] F.C.J. No. 242, 126 F.T.R. 229 (F.C.T.D.); Ruparel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1990] F.C.J. No. 701, [1990] 3 F.C. 615 (F.C.T.D.); and the discussion in L.
Waldman, Immigration Law and Practice, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2005),
at §2.13. Note, however, that in Crease v. Canada, [1994] 3 F.C. 480, [1994] F.C.J. No. 711
(F.C.T.D.), the Federal Court (Trial Division) found that the plaintiff, a Venezuelan citizen residing
outside Canada, had standing to bring a claim relying on s. 15(1) of the Charter. In this case, the
plaintiff sought to challenge a provision of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, which
precluded him from being granted Canadian citizenship in part because his mother was not a citizen
at the time of his birth in Venezuela. Although his mother had been born in Canada, at the time of
the plaintiff`s birth in 1943 anyone born in Canada was considered to be a British subject; the term
“Canadian citizen” did not come into effect until 1947. The Court determined that the plaintiff had
standing to bring a Charter challenge because the impugned law, as a domestic law, was subject to
Charter scrutiny, and because the plaintiff had a “direct connection to Canada” by birth to a
Canadian-born mother. The Court also believed that it would be “untenable” to deny him standing to
bring the Charter challenge on the basis that he was not a citizen, as his challenge was to the very
provision which prevented him from being granted citizenship. Ultimately, however, the Court
dismissed the action on the basis that to apply the Charter in this case would result in an
impermissible retroactive application of the Charter, and that the plaintiff‟s Charter rights had not
been infringed. See also Chazi c. Québec (Procureur général), [2008] J.Q. no. 8692 (Que. C.A.),
leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 461 (S.C.C.), wherein the Quebec Court of Appeal
46
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In her dissenting reasons in Cook, L‟Heureux-Dubé J. (McLachlin J.,
as she then was, concurring) asserted that determining whether a person
claiming a Charter right is the holder of such a right should precede an
analysis of the Charter‟s application under section 32(1). She wrote:
As a preliminary note I point out that my colleagues‟ reasons, like the
arguments of the parties, proceed on the assumption that the appellant
held Charter rights, even though he was neither present in Canada, nor
a Canadian citizen, at the time of the alleged violation of these rights.
In my opinion, this analysis misses a crucial first step — a
determination of whether the person claiming a Charter right is indeed
the holder of a right under the Canadian constitution. The question of
whether the claimant holds a right, in my view, must logically be
determined prior to the question of whether there is state action
involved that may have infringed that right. 49

The accused in Cook was an American citizen who had been
interrogated by Canadian detectives in the United States and prosecuted
in Canada for a murder that occurred in Canada. At his criminal trial in
Canada, he sought to have a statement obtained by the Canadian police
in the United States excluded on the basis that it had been obtained in
violation of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, which is
guaranteed to “everyone”, on arrest or detention.50 Neither party had put
forward arguments on the question of whether the appellant was the
beneficiary of this right, and the question was conceded by the Crown.
Without deciding the issue, L‟Heureux-Dubé J. cautioned against an
interpretation of the term “everyone” that did not take into account the
purposes of the Charter. She wrote:
The term “everyone” seems quite broad. Nevertheless, interpreting it
must take into account the purposes of the Charter. I am not convinced
that passage of the Charter necessarily gave rights to everyone in the
world, of every nationality, wherever they may be, even if certain rights
contain the word “everyone”. Rather, I think that it is arguable that
“everyone” was used to distinguish the rights granted to everyone on
the territory of Canada from those granted only to citizens of Canada
and those granted to persons charged with an offence. 51

reviewed the jurisprudence in this area but decided that it was not necessary to decide in that case
whether the appellants could claim the protection of s. 15(1) of the Charter (id., at paras. 63-92).
49
Cook, supra, note 5, at para. 85.
50
Section 10(b) provides that: “Everyone has the right on arrest or detention … to retain
and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.”
51
Cook, supra, note 5, at para. 86.
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Justice L‟Heureux-Dubé‟s concerns have been acknowledged by
other Supreme Court of Canada Justices. The majority in Hape noted her
assertion that a determination of whether someone is a rights holder
should precede an analysis of whether there is state action.52 In addition,
the majority in Cook did consider whether finding that the Charter
applied in that case would result in Charter rights that are guaranteed to
“everyone” being conferred too broadly. Writing for the majority, Cory
and Iacobucci JJ. stressed that their holding that the Charter applied to
the actions of the Canadian detectives was based on the particular facts
of that case. They wrote:
We caution that the holding in this case marks an exception to the
general rule in public international law … that a state cannot enforce its
laws beyond its territory. The exception arises on the basis of very
particular facts before us. Specifically, the impugned actions were
undertaken by Canadian governmental authorities in connection with
the investigation of a murder committed in Canada for a process to be
undertaken in Canada. The appellant, the rights claimant herein, was
being compulsorily brought before the Canadian justice system. This
situation is far different from the myriad of circumstances in which
persons outside Canada are trying to claim the benefits of the Charter
simpliciter.53

In these circumstances, the majority believed that it was “reasonable to
permit the appellant, who … [was] being made to adhere to Canadian
criminal law and procedure, to claim Canadian constitutional rights
relating to the interview conducted by the Canadian detectives in New
Orleans”.54
More recently, the issue of whether non-Canadian citizens outside
Canada are entitled to claim Charter rights was addressed in Amnesty.
The Federal Court of Appeal in Amnesty disposed of the appeal in part
on the basis that the detainees did not have rights guaranteed to
“everyone” under the Charter. With regard to this issue, the Court stated
that “[e]ven though section 7 of the Charter applies to „Everyone …‟
(compare with the words „Every citizen …‟ in section 6 of the Charter)
all the circumstances in a given situation must be examined before it can
be said that the Charter applies.”55 The Court concluded that in the

52
53
54
55

Hape, supra, note 4, at para. 81.
Cook, supra, note 5, at para. 53.
Id., at para. 51.
Amnesty, supra, note 32, at para. 20 (F.C.A.).
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circumstances, the detainees, as foreigners in another country with no
attachment to Canada or its laws, could not claim Charter rights.56
This issue was also recently addressed by the Federal Court in Slahi
v. Canada (Minister of Justice).57 Like Omar Khadr, the applicants in this
case — Mohamedou Ould Slahi and Ahcene Zemiri — were detainees in
Guantanamo Bay. Canadian officials had interviewed them in Guantanamo
Bay and had passed on information from those interviews to U.S.
authorities. Slahi and Zemiri sought disclosure from the federal Crown of
records of the interviews and records of information shared with the
United States for the purposes of habeas corpus petitions initiated by
them in the U.S. District Court. After the Crown refused to comply with
their requests, they brought an application for judicial review in the
Federal Court in Canada, alleging that their section 7 Charter rights had
been violated and seeking an order under section 24(1) of the Charter
directing disclosure.
The Federal Court declined to accept the Crown‟s attempts to
distinguish Khadr on the basis, among other things, that the applicants
sought disclosure for the purposes of their U.S. habeas corpus
proceedings in the U.S. District Court, rather than for prosecution in the
military commission regime impugned by the U.S. Supreme Court as
described in Khadr, and that there was an effective documentary
discovery process in the U.S. District Court.
The Federal Court found this case to be virtually identical to Khadr,
in that Canadian officials had participated in a process at Guantanamo
Bay that violated Canada‟s international human rights law obligations.
Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the application, distinguishing Khadr
on the basis that as non-Canadian citizens outside Canada with no
sufficient connection to Canada, the applicants were not entitled to avail
themselves of the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter.
In its analysis, the Court pointed to the dissenting comments of
L‟Heureux-Dubé J. in Cook, wherein she expressed doubt that the use of
the term “everyone” in certain provisions of the Charter “gave rights to
everyone in the world, of every nationality, wherever they may be”.58
The Court was also guided by what it saw as the purpose of the Charter,
56
Id., at paras. 14-21. The Federal Court also found that the detainees did not possess rights
under the Charter (Amnesty, id., at para. 327 (F.C.)).
57
[2009] F.C.J. No. 141, 2009 FC 160 (F.C.), affd 2009 FCA 259 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter
“Slahi & Zemiri”]. At the time of writing, leave to appeal had not been sought from the Supreme
Court of Canada.
58
Id., at para. 43 (F.C.), citing Cook, supra, note 5.
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namely to enshrine and protect the fundamental rights of Canadian
citizens and those within Canadian territory. The Court stated as follows:
It must be remembered that the Charter, an integral part of Canada‟s
supreme law, is a Canadian instrument enacted to enshrine and protect
the fundamental rights of Canadians and those finding themselves
within Canada‟s territory. Its extraterritorial reach is exceptional and
limited, as is mandated by respect for the principles of sovereignty and
judicial comity.59

The Court also remarked that the Supreme Court in Khadr had noted on
several occasions that Mr. Khadr was a Canadian citizen. Most
significant for the Court was the fact that the Supreme Court had created
a link between Canada‟s duty under section 7 to provide disclosure and
the fact that the liberty interests of a Canadian citizen were engaged. The
Court stated:
In its reasons, the Supreme Court noted several times that Mr. Khadr
was a Canadian citizen. Perhaps the most compelling of these passages
is at paragraph 31 where the Supreme Court stated:
… Thus, s. 7 imposes a duty on Canada to provide disclosure
of materials in its possession arising from its participation in
the foreign process that is contrary to international law and
jeopardizes the liberty of a Canadian citizen. [My emphasis.]60

The Court in Slahi & Zemiri reviewed Supreme Court of Canada
case law pertaining, for the most part, to the extraterritorial application of
the Charter, and found that the jurisprudence illustrated that the
protection of section 7 may be available to three categories of
individuals: (1) non-Canadians who are physically present in Canada;61
(2) non-Canadians who are subject to a criminal trial in Canada;62 and (3)
Canadian citizens outside Canada, in exceptional circumstances.63 The
59

Id., at para. 48.
Id., at para. 45.
61
See, e.g., Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No.
11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). In Singh, the issue was whether individuals physically present in
Canada who had been denied refugee status were entitled to the protection of s. 7 of the Charter.
Writing for Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. with respect to the Charter issue, Wilson J. accepted that
the term “everyone” in s. 7 of the Charter “includes every human being who is physically present in
Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law” (id., at para. 35).
62
See, e.g., Cook, supra, note 5. As was stated above, in Cook the accused was an
American citizen who had been questioned by Canadian police outside the country for the purposes
of his criminal trial in Canada.
63
See, e.g., R. v. A., [1990] S.C.J. No. 43, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.); Khadr, supra, note
6. In R. v. A., the appellants were Canadian citizens, one of whom had been subpoenaed to testify in
60
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Court concluded from its review that in order for section 7 Charter rights
to be asserted, the circumstances must connect the claimant with Canada,
either through presence in Canada, a criminal trial in Canada or Canadian
citizenship.64
In this case, the Court found that there was no such requisite
connection. Neither applicant was present in Canada, subject to a
criminal trial in Canada, or a Canadian citizen. The Court found that Mr.
Slahi had resided in Montreal for approximately two months, between
November 26, 1999 and January 21, 2000, after having been granted
landed immigrant status.65 Mr. Zemiri had been a resident from 1994 to
June 2001, but he had never obtained permanent resident status in
Canada.66 The Court found that these circumstances were not sufficient
to establish a nexus to Canada such that the applicants‟ section 7 rights
could be engaged. Nonetheless, the Court declined to award costs in this
matter, “in view of the uncertain state of the law on the question of the
extraterritorial application of the Charter to non-Canadians”.67 An appeal
to the Federal Court of Appeal was dismissed with costs, substantially
for the reasons given by the Federal Court.

IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has identified two issues arising from the Hape and
Khadr decisions that the Federal Courts have addressed. There are
several additional questions arising from these decisions that future
a criminal trial in Canada. As a result of a perceived threat to their security arising from the
testimony, particularly to the security of two of them who were outside the country, the appellants
applied to quash the subpoena or for a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Superior Court
dismissed the matter, in part on the basis that because two of the applicants were outside the country,
a s. 24(1) remedy was not available to them. When the matter came before the Supreme Court, the
majority directed a new hearing before the Superior Court. They noted that the appellants were all
Canadian citizens, that the RCMP had undertaken in Canada to provide them with protection, that
one of the appellants was required to testify in Canada, and that the two appellants outside Canada
had left in part due to assurances given by the RCMP. The majority stated (at para. 6) that:
[i]n those circumstances the judge was in error both in failing to consider the safety of the
appellants and in finding that in the special circumstances of this case remedies were not
available to persons who were out of the country.
.....
In the circumstances, the presiding judge might consider exercising either the inherent
jurisdiction of the court or the application of an appropriate Charter remedy.
64
Slahi & Zemiri, supra, note 57, at para. 47 (F.C.).
65
Id., at para. 8.
66
Id., at para. 13.
67
Id., at para. 55.
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courts in Canada may be required to consider. For example, to what
extent would a Canadian court pronounce on another country‟s adherence
to international law? The Supreme Court did not have to address this
issue in Khadr, in light of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
holding that detainees at Guantanamo Bay had illegally been denied
access to habeas corpus and that the procedures under which they were
to be prosecuted violated the Geneva Conventions. In Khadr, the Court
noted that issues may arise about whether it is appropriate for a Canadian
court to pronounce on the legality of a process within the territory of
another country.68
Questions may also arise concerning the nature of conduct sufficient
to constitute “participation” in activities that violate international human
rights obligations. In Khadr, the Supreme Court was careful to define
Canada‟s participation as sharing the product of the interviews with U.S.
authorities, as opposed to actually conducting the interviews of Mr.
Khadr. The Court wrote that “[m]erely conducting interviews with a
Canadian citizen held abroad under a violative process may not
constitute participation in that process,” as “[i]ndeed, it may often be
essential that Canadian officials interview citizens being held by
violative regimes to provide assistance to them.”69
In addition, courts may be called on to define exceptions, besides
consent, to the territorial jurisdiction of states as recognized by
international law, and to pronounce on how they would affect the
extraterritorial application of the Charter.70 For example, a future court
may be required to pronounce on whether extra-territorial jurisdiction in
68

Khadr, supra, note 6, at para. 21.
Id., at para. 27.
70
In Amnesty, supra, note 32, the Federal Courts determined that “effective military control
of the person” was not an exceptional basis recognized at international law that would allow for the
extra-territorial application of the Charter. Note that the U.S. Supreme Court, the House of Lords
and the European Court of Human Rights have all held, in determining the extraterritorial
application of different human rights instruments, that a state exercises jurisdiction outside its own
territory only under very limited, exceptional circumstances recognized at international law (see
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, at 2257-2259 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, at
2220-2222, 2225 (2008); Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, at paras. 49,
97, 109; Bankovic v. Belgium (2001), 11 BHRC 435 (GC), at paras. 59-60, 71, 73). The European
Court of Human Rights has indicated that those exceptional circumstances are: (a) consent: the
government of the state with de jure sovereignty over the territory consents to the application of the
laws of a foreign state; (b) effective control of territory: a state occupies territory of another state,
exercising all or some of the public powers normally exercised by the government; or (c) specific
situations where customary international law and treaty provisions have recognized the
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, such as within embassies or on board aircraft and vessels
registered in or flying the flag of that state. See Bankovic v. Belgium, id., at paras. 59-60, 71, 73.
69
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respect of embassies and consulates exists in international law, and
whether the Charter applies within a Canadian embassy or consulate.
It is important to recognize that it does not follow from a
determination that the Charter does not apply extra-territorially that no
laws will apply to the conduct of Canadian officials outside Canada.
Moreover, as the decisions in Amnesty demonstrate, there is a framework
of international law which has as its object the protection of human
rights.

